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OF SOCIAL MEDIA WEBSITE PRINTOUTS 
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ABSTRACT 
Social media posts and photographs are increasingly denied 
admission as evidence in criminal trials. Courts often cite issues 
with authentication when refusing to admit social media 
evidence. Cases and academic writings separate recent case law 
into two approaches: The Maryland Approach and the Texas 
Approach. The first method is often seen as overly skeptical of 
social media evidence, setting the bar too high for admissibility. 
The second approach is viewed as more lenient, declaring that 
any reasonable evidence should be admitted in order for a jury 
to weigh its sufficiency. This Brief addresses the supposed 
differences between the two sets of cases and suggests that 
courts are not actually employing two distinct approaches. The 
Maryland Approach courts are not holding social media content 
to a higher standard than the Texas Approach courts, but are 
merely responding to a lack of evidence connecting the proffered 
content to the purported author. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Sarah and Megan, both thirteen years old, had been friends for 
most of their lives. They went to the same school, were always spending 
time at the other’s house, and even traveled with each other’s family for 
vacations. As sometimes happens when getting older, however, Megan 
transferred from the public school to a Catholic school and the two girls 
had a “falling out.” Sometime thereafter, Sarah became worried that 
Megan might be spreading rumors about her old friend to her new social 
group. Sarah’s mother shared her daughter’s concerns, and conceived of 
a scheme to humiliate Megan.  
 Sarah’s mother set up a fictitious MySpace account under the 
name “Josh Evans.” “Josh” was sixteen years old, attractive, and new to 
the neighborhood. She then used the new account to draw Megan into 
conversation online. About two weeks later, Sarah’s mother had Josh tell 
Megan that he no longer liked her and that the world would be a better 
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place without Megan in it. Distraught, the thirteen-year-old hung herself 
in her bedroom closet that night.1 
 The circumstances leading to Megan’s death demonstrate the 
relative ease with which anyone can create a fictional persona online, 
sometimes with horrific consequences. In the world of social media, it is 
particularly easy for users to create fake accounts, access and manipulate 
another’s account, and then change or delete the material at a later date. 
The electronic nature of social media evidence presents many new legal 
challenges, leaving case law regarding this type of evidence murky at 
best. The requirement of authentication is therefore especially vital for 
social media evidence to ensure that the offered material is what it 
appears to be. The proponent should not only offer evidence that the 
printout accurately reflects the online webpage, but also that it was 
created by the purported author. Only then can the evidence be properly 
presented to a jury. 
I. THE PREVALENCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
Social media is defined as “forms of electronic communications 
. . . through which users create online communities to share information, 
ideas, personal messages, and other content.”2 Social media sites are 
“sophisticated tools of communication where the user voluntarily 
provides information that the user wants to share with others.”3 These 
web-based applications allow users to create a personal profile, often 
containing a photograph of the user along with name, location, and the 
ability to “post” statements for others to view.4 Social network sites 
range from social communities such as Facebook and MySpace to the 
professional network LinkedIn.5  
The popularity of social media sites cannot be overstated. As one 
District Judge and legal scholar wrote: “Social media is ubiquitous, and it 
                                                      
1 All background information comes from United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 
449 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
2  Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/ 
dictionary/social%20media (last visited Sept. 24, 2015). 
3 Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 437 n.3 (Md. 2009). 
4 Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 685 (Del. 2014). 
5  U.S. JUD. CONF. COMM. ON CODES OF CONDUCT, RESOURCE 
 PACKET FOR DEVELOPING GUIDELINES ON USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA BY JUDICIAL 
EMPLOYEES 9 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
conduct/SocialMediaLayout.pdf.  
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is here to stay.”6 At the beginning of 2014, eighty-nine percent of 18-29 
year olds with Internet access used social networking sites.7 Facebook 
boasts 1.35 billion monthly active users as of September 30, 2014.8 This 
equates to one out of every 5.5 people in the world.9 The influential 
website has become a constant in many users’ lives, with sixty-three 
percent of users reportedly accessing the site at least once a day.10 
Given the great prevalence of social media today, it is not 
surprising that online content has made its way into courtrooms. After 
creating a profile, users will frequently post items such as text, pictures, 
or videos to their profile page. Often, these posts include relevant 
evidence for a trial.11 Social media is offered in trials to show, among 
other things, a party’s state of mind, intent, or motives.12 Parties may 
wish to submit social media as evidence of communication between 
users, inculpatory or exculpatory photographs, or even party 
admissions. 13  Attorneys and judges are dealing with social media 
evidence more and more as the Internet and technology continue to 
advance. 
II. DETERMINING AUTHENTICITY OF EVIDENCE IN GENERAL 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[R]elevant evidence is 
admissible” unless otherwise provided and “[i]rrelevant evidence is not 
admissible.”14 This seemingly straightforward rule is complicated by 
subsequent limitations on what qualifies as “relevant.” At the most basic 
level, a party who wishes to admit evidence must first ask, “Does this 
evidence have ‘any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence?’” 15 If she can answer affirmatively, then 
that evidence has passed the first hurdle of relevance.  
                                                      
6 Paul W. Grimm, Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & Melissa M. O’Toole-Loureiro, 
Authentication of Social Media Evidence, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433, 437 
(2013). 
7 PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT, SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE 2013 (Dec. 30, 
2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/12/30/social-media-update-2013/#. 
8 FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2014). 
9 See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. and World Population Clock, CENSUS.GOV 
http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2014) (listing world 
population of 7.21 billion people). 
10 PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT, supra note 7. 
11 Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 685 (Del. 2014). 
12 Grimm, supra note 6, at 438. 
13 Id. 
14 FED. R. EVID. 402. 
15 FED. R. EVID. 401(a). 
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Any tangible or demonstrative exhibits must then be 
authenticated in order to be relevant.16 The proponent offering the piece 
of writing must produce evidence “sufficient to support a finding that the 
item is what the proponent claims it is.”17 For an exhibit such as a social 
media post, this would typically involve demonstrating that the writing 
has a connection to a specific person, through authorship or some other 
relation.18  
It is easy to appreciate the importance of authentication when 
considering a document such as a letter. Suppose an attorney offers a 
letter at trial which she claims was written by the defendant. She declares 
that the letter perfectly demonstrates the defendant’s state of mind at the 
time he wrote it. This would be very persuasive to the jury. The 
attorney’s assertion can only be true, however, if the defendant actually 
did author the letter. If another person wrote it, then the jury has learned 
nothing new about the defendant’s state of mind, and the letter is 
irrelevant. Authentication ensures that before the jury hears any 
evidence, the proponent has connected it to the trial in a way that ensures 
the evidence is actually what she claims it to be. 
In Rule 901, the Federal Rules of Evidence offer multiple ways 
in which proponents can authenticate a particular item. The simplest 
technique is providing testimony from a witness who has knowledge that 
the evidence is what it claims to be.19 Another method involves pointing 
to distinctive characteristics of the evidence that can authenticate the 
item.20 For example, an email may state facts that only one person could 
know, or use a language pattern known to match a particular person.21 
The proponent may also demonstrate that the evidence was created by a 
process or system which produces accurate results. 22 Thus, an X-ray 
machine is assumed to create an authentic portrayal of the bones it has 
scanned.23 These examples are not an exclusive list of authentication 
methods.24 An attorney may use any number of methods to fulfill the 
authentication requirement.  
                                                      
16 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 221 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 7th ed. 2014). 
17 FED. R. EVID. 901(a). 
18 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 16. 
19 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1). 
20 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4). 
21 FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee’s note. 
22 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9). 
23 FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee’s note. 
24 See id. (“The examples are not intended as an exclusive enumeration of 
allowable methods but are meant to guide and suggest, leaving room for growth 
and development in this area of the law.”). 
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Preliminary questions about the admissibility of evidence are 
decided by the trial judge.25 This means that the court’s role is to serve as 
a “gatekeeper” in deciding whether the proponent has offered evidence 
sufficient to meet the 901 authentication requirement.26 He does not need 
to be satisfied that the evidence is actually what it purports to be,27 only 
that it is reasonably possible for a jury to find that it is authentic.28 After 
the court determines that the proponent has successfully met this 
threshold requirement, it is for the trier-of-fact to appraise the credibility 
and weight of the proffered evidence.29 The jury must decide whether the 
item is what it seems to be.30 
III. DETERMINING AUTHENTICITY OF SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE 
The state of the law regarding social media evidence 
admissibility is murky at best. Courts and academic writings have split 
the case law into two approaches. These can best be referred to as “The 
Maryland Approach” and “The Texas Approach.”31   
According to analysts, Maryland Approach courts are skeptical 
of social media evidence, finding the odds too great that someone other 
than the alleged author of the evidence was the actual creator.32 The 
proponent must therefore affirmatively disprove the existence of a 
different creator in order for the evidence to be admissible.33 
Courts following the Texas Approach are seen as more lenient in 
determining what amount of evidence a “reasonable juror” would need to 
be persuaded that the alleged creator did create the evidence.34 The 
burden of production then transfers to the objecting party to demonstrate 
                                                      
25 FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
26 United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 2009). 
27 United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
28 Vidacak, 553 F.3d at 349. 
29 FED. R. EVID. 104. 
30 In the event of a bench trial, the judge will act as trier-of-fact rather than a 
jury. 
31  I have adopted the terms “The Maryland Approach” and “The Texas 
Approach,” first used in Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682 (Del. 2014), as convenient 
titles for the two perceived methods. 
32 Grimm, supra note 6, at 455. 
33 Id. 
34 See, e.g., United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014); State v. Assi, 
No. 1 CA-CR 10-0900, 2012 WL 3580488 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2012); 
People v. Valdez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628 (Ct. App. 2011); People v. Clevenstine, 
891 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Manuel v. State, 357 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011). 
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that the evidence was created or manipulated by a third party.35 This 
second approach is viewed as “better reasoned” because it allows for 
proper interplay among the many rules that govern admissibility, 
including 901.36  
A. The Maryland Approach  
This first approach’s seemingly higher standard for social media 
authentication is best exemplified by the Maryland Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Griffin v. State.37 The defendant in Griffin was charged with 
second-degree murder, first degree assault, and use of a handgun in 
commission of a felony.38 The State offered printouts from a MySpace 
profile belonging to the defendant’s girlfriend, Jessica Barber, to 
demonstrate that Barber had allegedly threatened one of the State’s 
witnesses.39 The page contained the statement: “FREE BOOZY [(the 
nickname for the defendant)]!!!! JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET 
STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!”40 The printout displayed 
the name of the profile as “Sistahsouljah,” and described details of the 
profile owner’s life such as a birthday of 10/02/1983 and location of Port 
Deposit. 41 A photograph of Griffin and Barber embracing was also 
included.42 
Rather than using Barber to authenticate the pages, the State 
attempted to use an investigator’s testimony.43 The lead investigator for 
the case, Sergeant John Cook, downloaded the information from 
MySpace.44 Cook testified that he knew it was Barber’s profile due to the 
photograph of her and Boozy, a reference to the children, and her birth 
date listed on the form.45 Defense counsel objected because “the State 
could not sufficiently establish a ‘connection’ between the profile and 
posting and Ms. Barber.”46 The printouts were admitted and Griffin was 
convicted. 
                                                      
35 See Tienda, 538 S.W.3d at 642–47. 
36 Grimm, supra note 6, at 456. 
37 Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415 (Md. App. 2011). 
38 Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791, 794 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). 
39 Griffin, 19 A.3d at 418. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 348–50. 
45 Id. at 418. 
46 Id. at 348. 
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Griffin appealed the decision, asserting that the printouts were 
not properly authenticated and therefore inadmissible.47 The Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals upheld the verdict. After another appeal 
request, the Maryland Court of Appeals accepted the case to decide 
whether the MySpace printout was representative of a profile created by 
Barber, and also whether she had posted the “SNITCHES GET 
STICHES” warning.48  
The appellate court noted that very few courts in any jurisdiction 
had an opportunity to consider the authentication of pages printed from a 
social media site. 49  It stated that “[t]he potential for fabricating or 
tampering with electronically stored information on a social networking 
site” posed “significant challenges” when considering authenticity of site 
printouts.50 The court nonetheless maintained that Rule 901 governed 
authentication.51 This rule states that circumstantial evidence “such as 
appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, location, or other 
distinctive characteristics” can be offered as evidence that the article is 
what it claims to be.52 The court reversed and remanded, holding that a 
birthdate, location, reference to the defendant’s nickname, and a 
photograph of the couple were not sufficiently “distinctive 
characteristics” to authenticate a MySpace printout.53 When explaining 
its decision, it cited a concern that “someone other than the alleged 
author may have accessed the account and posted the message in 
question.”54  
In State v. Eleck, the defendant appealed his conviction of assault 
in the first degree by means of a dangerous instrument.55 Eleck claimed 
on appeal that the trial court improperly excluded evidence that had been 
properly authenticated. 56  At a party with about twenty intoxicated 
teenagers in attendance, the defendant engaged two party guests in a 
                                                      
47 Id. at 417. 
48 Id. at 419–20. 
49 Id. at 422. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. (citing the state law which is materially similar to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 901). 
52 Id. (emphasis added).  
53 Id. at 423–24. 
54 Id. at 423 (quoting Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791, 805 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2010)). 
55 State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 819 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011). 
56 Id. 
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physical altercation.57 When the combatants were separated, Eleck’s two 
opponents both discovered that they had suffered stab wounds.58 
At his trial, Eleck offered printouts of Facebook messages 
allegedly received from a State’s witness, another attendant of the 
party.59 The defendant personally testified as to the authenticity of the 
printouts, stating that the user name belonged to the witness, the profile 
contained photographs of the witness, and that he had downloaded and 
printed the messages himself.60 The State’s witness admitted that the 
profile was hers, but claimed that her account had been hacked and she 
had not sent the messages in question.61 
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision not to 
admit the evidence,62 determining that even unique user names and 
passwords are not enough to eliminate the possibility of hackers.63 The 
court explained that authenticating that a message came from a specific 
account is not sufficient evidence that it was authored by the account 
owner.64 The messages themselves did not “reflect distinct information 
that only [the witness] would have possessed regarding the defendant or 
the character of their relationship.” 65  The authorship had not been 
sufficiently authenticated. 
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Williams, an appellate court 
found that the prosecution had failed to offer adequate foundation as to 
the authorship of MySpace messages.66 In this case, the defendant was 
convicted of murder in the first degree of one victim and assault with 
intent to commit murder of another victim.67 At trial, the girlfriend of one 
of the victims testified about MySpace messages she received from the 
defendant’s brother, warning her not to testify at trial.68 The testimony 
was admitted without objection, but the defendant later unsuccessfully 
submitted motions to strike the testimony and declare a mistrial.69 
                                                      
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 820. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 825. 
63 Id. at 822. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 824. 
66 Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1173 (Mass. 2010). 
67 Id. at 1165. 
68 Id. at 1172. 
69 Id. at 1171. 
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When reviewing the authentication issue, the appellate  court 
compared the MySpace messages to a phone call: “[A] witness’ 
testimony that he or she has received an incoming call from a person 
claiming to be ‘A,’ without more, is insufficient evidence to admit the 
call as a conversation with ‘A.’”70 Although the foundational testimony 
had established that “the messages were sent by someone with access to 
[the defendant’s] MySpace Web page,” there was no evidence regarding 
“the person who actually sent the message.”71 The court referenced a 
lack of evidence concerning how secure MySpace is, how a person 
accesses the page, and whether passwords or codes are used.72 Allowing 
the jury to hear this testimony would create a high potential for 
prejudice, and the court ruled that the content of the messages should not 
have been admitted.73 
B. The Texas Approach  
 Many courts have followed what has been termed the more 
lenient “Texas Approach.”74 This approach is best exemplified by Tienda 
v. State. After being convicted of murder, Tienda appealed the decision, 
claiming that the trial court should not have admitted evidence from 
MySpace pages alleged to be managed by the defendant.75 The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, as did the Court of 
Criminal Appeals.76 
 The victim was traveling home from a nightclub when his car 
unexpectedly came under gunfire from a caravan of three or four cars on 
the same road.77 Tienda, the appellant, was a passenger in one of the 
caravan’s cars.78 The Court admitted several MySpace accounts into 
evidence allegedly belonging to the appellant.79 Each account was linked 
to email addresses including Tienda’s name or nickname, had a profile 
name matching either Tienda’s name or nickname, listed Tienda’s 
                                                      
70 Id. at 1172 (citing Commonwealth v. Hartford, 194 N.E.2d 401 (Mass. 1963)). 
71 Id. at 1172–73. 
72 Id. at 1172. 
73 Id. at 1173. 
74 See, e.g., United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014); State v. Assi, 
No. 1 CA-CR 10-0900, 2012 WL 3580488 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2012); 
People v. Valdez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628 (Ct. App. 2011); People v. Clevenstine, 
891 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Manuel v. State, 357 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011). 
75 Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 634. 
76 Id. at 634.  
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Id. at 634–35. 
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hometown as the location, and contained photographs of a man who 
“resembled” Tienda.80 The accounts contained postings such as, “You 
aint BLASTIN You aint Lastin”81 and “EVERYONE WUZ BUSTIN 
AND THEY ONLY TOLD ON ME.”82  
 In affirming the intermediate appellate and trial courts, the Court 
of Criminal Appeals compared the current case to Griffin, stating that 
“there [were] far more circumstantial indicia of authenticity in this case 
than in Griffin.” 83  The combination of photographs, references to 
particular situations, and messages sent from accounts bearing the 
appellant’s name—“taken as a whole with all of the individual particular 
details considered in combination”—was deemed sufficient for a 
reasonable jury to believe that Tienda created and maintained the 
profiles.84 
 In People v. Clevenstine,85 the defendant was convicted of five 
counts of rape and six other charges such as sexual abuse and 
endangering the welfare of a child.86  Clevenstine challenged that a 
computer disk with MySpace and Facebook messages between him and 
the victims had not been properly authenticated.87 Both victims had 
testified that the defendant had messaged them through social media 
sites.88 The State Police investigator had retrieved the conversations 
directly from the victims’ hard drives.89 A legal compliance officer from 
Facebook testified that the messages did originate from the purported 
accounts.90 The defendant’s wife also testified that she had seen the same 
sexually explicit messages on her husband’s MySpace account on their 
home computer.91 While the court recognized that the defendant’s claim 
that someone else accessed his MySpace account was possible, “the 
likelihood of such a scenario presented a factual issue for the jury.”92 
 
                                                      
80 Id. at 634–36. 
81 Id. at 635. 
82 Id. at 636. 
83 Id. at 647. 
84 Id. at 645. 
85 891 N.Y.D.2d 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
86 Id. at 513. 
87 Id. at 514. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
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IV. ARE THE TWO APPROACHES ACTUALLY DIFFERENT? 
In just the past two years, the distinction between the Maryland 
Approach and the Texas Approach has been widening. The most likely 
source for the separation is Honorable Paul W. Grimm’s 2013 article, 
Authentication of Social Media Evidence.93 In this American Journal of 
Trial Advocacy article, Grimm clearly draws a line between what he sees 
as two separate approaches to social media authentication. The first 
approach involves courts setting “an unnecessarily high bar for the 
admissibility of social media evidence.”94 The second utilizes a different 
method, “determining the admissibility of social media evidence based 
on whether there was sufficient evidence of authenticity for a reasonable 
jury to conclude that the evidence was authentic.”95 This distinction has 
been reiterated often in the past two years. 
Courts and attorneys have cited directly to Grimm’s article in 
case opinions and briefs. A 2014 case, Parker v. State,96 references the 
article before separating past cases into “The Maryland Approach” and 
“The Texas Approach.”97 It portrays Griffin and Tienda respectively as 
the prime examples of each method,98 just as in Grimm’s article.99 The 
appellee’s brief for Harris v. State,100 quotes Grimm’s article several 
times when asserting that Griffin set an “unnecessarily high bar” for 
authentication of social media evidence.101 The appellant’s brief in the 
currently pending case, Sublet v. State,102 similarly references the article 
while claiming that a court was “inappropriately strict” in its 
interpretation of evidence law.103 In citing Grimm, judges and attorneys 
are adopting the distinction between unnecessarily strict courts and those 
that are more lenient. 
The distinction is also being reinforced in secondary sources. 
The Practical Law section of Westlaw informs litigators that most courts 
                                                      
93 Grimm, supra note 6. 
94 Id. at 441. 
95 Id. 
96 85 A.3d 682 (Del. 2014). 
97 Id. 
98 See id. at 686 (stating that the higher standard for social media evidence “is 
best exemplified by . . . Griffin v. State” and the “alternative line of cases” is 
best represented by Tienda). 
99 See Grimm, supra note 6, at 441, 449 (using Griffin and Tienda as the first 
cases to describe each approach). 
100 No. 42, slip op. (Md. Apr. 23, 2015).  
101 Id. at *31. 
102 No. 59 (Md. Apr. 23, 2015). 
103 Id. at *24 n.20. 
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employ a practice of admitting evidence “if the party demonstrates to the 
trial judge that a jury could reasonably find that the proffered evidence is 
authentic.”104 It then explains that other courts recommend a “higher 
standard.”105  It once again provides Tienda and Griffin as the two 
paradigms.106 Another 2014 article, The Pitfalls and Perils of Social 
Media in Litigation, compares more lenient cases to those in which a 
“greater degree of authentication” is required.107 
Dividing the case law into two such distinct categories ignores 
the similar reasoning behind the courts’ decisions and fails to take into 
account rules that govern admissibility other than those in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  
The state of case law as it pertains to social media evidence has 
evolved considerably in the past decade and a half. In 1999, one court 
deciding whether to admit printouts of a webpage declared, “There is no 
way Plaintiff can overcome the presumption that the information he 
discovered on the Internet is inherently untrustworthy. . . . [A]ny 
evidence procured off the Internet is adequate for almost nothing.”108 
While courts sometimes still display a distrust of social media 
evidence,109 they no longer discount it as completely useless. Courts and 
legal scholars have generally agreed that although rapidly developing 
technology may present new challenges, the existing rules of evidence 
regarding authenticity are “adequate to the task.”110 
Social media evidence is most often offered as evidence at trial 
as printouts of webpages. Determining admissibility of these printouts 
involves two steps: (1) “Printouts of web pages must first be 
                                                      
104 Norman C. Simon & Samantha V. Ettari, Social Media: What Every Litigator 
Needs to Know, PRACTICAL LAW, (to access this article, log in to Westlaw Next; 
follow “Practical Law”; follow “Litigation”; search for “social media” in search 
bar; follow hyperlink for appropriate article) (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 PAUL RAGUSA & LAUREN EMERSON, THE PITFALLS AND PERILS OF SOCIAL 
MEDIA IN LITIGATION (2014), available at Westlaw 2014 WL 5465789. 
108 St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774–75 
(S.D. Tex. 1999) (emphasis added). 
109 See, e.g., People v. Beckley, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 366–67 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(stating that even unskilled, inexperienced users can utilize Photoshop to change 
photographs to produce false pictures) and State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (stating that “electronic communication . . . could be 
generated by someone other than the named sender”). 
110 Steven Good, The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence, 29 REV. LITIG. 1, 7 
(Fall 2009). 
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authenticated as accurately reflecting the content and image of a specific 
webpage on the computer,” and then (2) in order to be relevant, the 
printout “must be authenticated as having been posted by that source.”111 
The judge acts as a gatekeeper in determining whether the party offering 
the evidence has fulfilled this requirement of relevance.112   
The cases listed as following the Maryland Approach are 
examples of proponents fulfilling the first requirement, but failing to 
satisfy or even address the second. These courts are not holding social 
media evidence to a higher standard than any other; they are recognizing 
that an important condition for admissibility has not been met. 
The clearest example of this is the case listed as the exemplar 
Maryland Approach case, Griffin v. State. The oft-quoted holding states: 
The potential for abuse and manipulation of a social networking site 
by someone other than its purported creator and/or user leads to our 
conclusion that a printout of an image from such a site requires a 
greater degree of authentication than merely identifying the date of 
birth of the creator and her visage in a photograph on the site in 
order to reflect that [the purported creator] was its creator and the 
author of the [relevant] language.113 
While Grimm seems to focus on the first half of this statement, 
attributing the court’s holding to an overly suspicious view of social 
media content, it is actually the second half that explains the decision. 
While an investigator’s testimony demonstrated that the printouts were in 
fact downloaded from MySpace, the State failed to connect the 
statements to the purported creator. Unless they were posted by the 
alleged source, the warnings were not relevant to the case. The appellate 
court therefore correctly concluded that the printouts had been 
improperly admitted during the trial. 
 Tienda v. State, often presented in articles and opinions as the 
opposite of Griffin, explicitly compared its own situation to that of the 
Maryland case.114 It held that a greater amount of circumstantial evidence 
supported a finding that “the MySpace pages belonged to the appellant 
and that he created and maintained them.”115 The difference between 
Griffin and Tienda was not a heightened admissibility standard. The 
difference was that only in the latter case did the advocate both 
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authenticate the webpage and connect that page to the purported 
author/maintainer. 
 This failure to show authorship also occurred in State v. Eleck. 
The State’s witness acknowledged that the Facebook account was hers.116 
This sufficiently authenticated the printout as representative of her 
account. The State could not, however, show that she sent the messages. 
The witness asserted that her account had been hacked,117 and the court 
concluded that there was nothing inherent in the messages that identified 
her as the author.118 Because the State was not able to authenticate the 
messages as being connected to the purported source, the MySpace 
statements were not relevant to the case and therefore inadmissible as 
evidence. 
 Similarly, MySpace messages offered in Commonwealth v. 
Williams were also ruled inadmissible. The court acknowledged the two-
prong requirement for admitting communications by comparing the web 
messages to a phone call. A witness can state that she had a conversation, 
but for that conversation to be relevant it still must be shown that it was 
with the purported other person. The court found that although the 
foundational testimony had established that the person who sent the 
messages had access to the webpage, there was no evidence of who that 
person actually was. The court did not subscribe to any standard higher 
than that required of other evidence. The proponent simply failed to 
fulfill the requirements for admitting webpage printouts. 
 People v. Clavenstine is a case comparable to Williams while 
still following the more lenient Texas Approach. Here, the proponent 
offered MySpace messages taken directly from the victims’ hard 
drives, 119  fulfilling the first requirement. The defendant’s wife also 
testified that she had seen the messages on her husband’s computer.120 
The messages were appropriately connected not only to the account, but 
also to the author himself. With both requirements satisfied, the evidence 
was admitted.  
 Numerous other cases that seemingly follow the Maryland 
Approach share this same element of failing to demonstrate connection 
to the purported author. In Commonwealth v. Wallick,121 the proponent 
authenticated a photograph as coming from a MySpace page, but failed 
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to show who created/maintained the page.122 An expert in People v. 
Beckley testified that a MySpace photograph was not forged, but no 
evidence was offered that the picture was what it purported to be—a girl 
flashing an alleged gang sign.123 Even if the court in United States v. 
Jackson agreed that postings about white supremacist groups did appear 
on the web, it still noted a lack of evidence regarding whether the posts 
actually were posted by the groups.124  
CONCLUSION 
 Courts using the Maryland Approach are not placing an 
excessively high bar on social media evidence, or even following a 
stricter standard than the Texas Approach cases. They are simply 
recognizing that evidence must be relevant before it may be presented to 
the jury. In the case of website printouts, this means showing that the 
content reflects a certain webpage and that it was posted by the purported 
source. Opinions and articles drawing a distinct line between “Maryland” 
and “Texas” approaches are actually just pointing out the cases in which 
the second requirement was not fulfilled. Viewing the differing opinions 
as two opposite approaches not only creates an artificial distinction, but 
also increases the probability that future courts will misinterpret the 
admissibility standards and create an actual divergence in analysis. 
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